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LANE V. FRANKS: THE SUPREME COURT CLARIFIES 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES’ FREE SPEECH RIGHTS 
 
Thomas A. Schweitzer
*
 
On June 19, 2014, the United States Supreme Court decided 
an important First Amendment case concerning the free speech rights 
of government employees.1
  
While public employees speaking as citi-
zens on issues of public concern have the same right to freedom of 
speech
 
as other citizens when they speak on matters of public con-
cern, the Court has held that when they make statements pursuant to 
their official duties, they must accept certain limitations on their free-
dom of speech.2  In Lane v. Franks, the Court unanimously rejected 
the extreme position of the Eleventh Circuit, which had held that a 
public official had no remedy when he was fired in retaliation for 
turning in a “no show” office holder who was tried, convicted and 
imprisoned.3 
While two other appellate courts had conferred broader pro-
tection on public employees’ free speech rights in similar cases, there 
were only a handful of such cases.4  However, Lane’s actions, which 
presumably led to his termination, manifestly promoted the public in-
terest in combatting government corruption.5  Thus, the lower courts’ 
position that Lane had suffered no remediable wrong, evidently con-
vinced all the justices that prompt action was required to set the Elev-
enth Circuit straight.6 
 
* Professor of Law, Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center of Touro College.  The original version 
of this article was published as a two part series in the Suffolk Lawyer, in November and 
December of 2014.  This version contains footnotes and updated text. 
1 Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 2374-75 (2014). 
2 Id. at 2383. 
3 Id. 
4 Id. at 2377; see Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 674 (1994) and City of San Diego v. 
Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 82 (2004). 
5 Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2380 (citing Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 425 (2006)). 
6 Id. at 2376-77. 
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I. LANE V. FRANKS IN THE LOWER COURTS 
Edward Lane was the Director of the Community Intensive 
Training for Youth, (“CITY”), that was located at a public communi-
ty college in Alabama.7  Upon discovering that Alabama State Repre-
sentative Suzanne Schmitz was on CITY’s payroll in what amounted 
to a “no show” job, Lane confronted Schmitz and ordered her to re-
port for work, but she refused.8  Lane subsequently fired the recalci-
trant Schmitz, despite having been warned by the college president, 
Steve Franks, that this could have negative repercussions for him and 
the college.9  Schmitz told a fellow employee that she intended to 
“get [Lane] back” for firing her.10 
After the FBI investigated, Lane testified before a federal 
grand jury about his reasons for firing Schmitz.11  Schmitz was in-
dicted and convicted on seven felony counts in a federal trial at which 
Lane, pursuant to a subpoena, testified against her.12  She was sen-
tenced to thirty months in prison and ordered to make restitution of 
over $177,000.13  Franks then fired Lane, who sued him under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that his termination was in retaliation for tes-
tifying against Schmitz and violated his First Amendment rights.14 
The Federal District Court of the Northern District of Ala-
bama granted summary judgment in favor of defendant Franks.15  The 
court held that Franks was protected by qualified immunity for the 
individual claims against him, and the Eleventh Amendment barred 
the claims against him in his official capacity.16  The court also con-
cluded that because Lane had learned about Schmitz’s criminal con-
duct while working as a government official, his testimony that 
brought Schmitz to justice could be considered “as part of his official 
job duties and not made as a citizen on a matter of public concern.”17  
 
7 Id. at 2375. 
8 Id. 
9 Id. 
10 Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2375. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. at 2376. 
15 Lane v. Cent. Ala. Cmty. Coll., No. CV-11-BE-0883, 2012 WL 5289412, at *6 (N.D. 
Ala. Oct. 18, 2012). 
16 Id. at *12. 
17 Id. at *10. 
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The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in a per curiam opinion af-
firmed this decision, concluding that the First Amendment did not 
protect Lane’s statements.18 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari “to resolve discord 
among the Courts of Appeals as to whether public employees may be 
fired—or suffer other adverse employment consequences—for 
providing truthful subpoenaed testimony outside the course of their 
ordinary job responsibilities.”19 
II. PRIOR SUPREME COURT CASES ON PUBLIC EMPLOYEES’ 
FREE SPEECH RIGHTS: PICKERING, CONNICK, AND GARCETTI 
The Supreme Court has long held that special rules apply to 
government employees’ free speech rights.20  Public employees do 
not forfeit their free speech rights when they take government jobs, 
but efficient operation of the government requires that it maintain a 
“significant degree of control over [its] employees’ words and ac-
tions”21 in the exercise of their official duties.  However, “[s]peech by 
citizens on matters of public concern lies at the heart of the First 
Amendment . . . .”22 
In the leading case of Pickering v. Board of Education,23 the 
Board of Education fired Marvin Pickering, a public high school 
teacher, after his letter criticizing the Board’s handling of proposed 
bond issues and tax increases was published in a local newspaper.24  
He sued, and the Illinois lower courts and its supreme court rejected 
his First Amendment arguments.25  The U.S. Supreme Court re-
versed, emphasizing that school finance issues were matters of public 
concern on which the Superintendent of Schools and teachers groups 
had published a number of articles in the newspaper.26  The Court 
stated that if matters of public concern are at issue, then even criti-
 
18 Lane v. Cent. Ala. Cmty. Coll., 523 F. App’x 709, 711 (11th Cir. 2013) (per curiam). 
19 Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2377. 
20 Id. at 2374; see Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205, Will Cnty., 391 
U.S. 563, 568 (1968). 
21 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418 (2006). 
22 Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2377. 
23 391 U.S. 563 (1968). 
24 Pickering, 391 U.S. at 564. 
25 Id. at 565; see Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205, 225 N.E.2d 1 (Ill. 
1967), rev’d, 391 U.S. 563 (1968). 
26 Pickering, 391 U.S. at 572, 575. 
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cism by public employees of their superiors deserves First Amend-
ment protection.27 
The Supreme Court later cut back on public employees’ free 
speech protection in Connick v. Myers28 and Garcetti v. Ceballos.29  
The Court in Connick held that the speech of a government employ-
ee, which led to her firing, was not constitutionally protected because 
it involved personnel matters rather than issues of public concern.30 
Assistant district attorney Myers, who was upset about being 
transferred to a different department, distributed to her colleagues a 
questionnaire about office morale and the need for a grievance com-
mittee.31  District Attorney Connick32 fired her for insubordination,33 
and the Court upheld this 5-4.34  Reversing the Fifth Circuit and the 
district court, the Court observed that the district attorney could rea-
sonably believe that the questionnaire would undermine his authority 
and disrupt close working relationships in the office.35  It noted that 
federal court was not the appropriate forum in which to review the 
wisdom of a personnel action, which was not a matter of public con-
cern.36 
Garcetti involved a similar claim by a deputy district attorney, 
who alleged in court that he had suffered retaliation for his perfor-
mance of his duties.37  As “calendar deputy,” Ceballos had to review 
search warrants when requested to by defense attorneys.38  In a crim-
inal case, he found that a deputy sheriff’s affidavit in support of a 
search warrant contained allegations which he did not find credible.39  
He wrote a memorandum to his superiors questioning the affidavit.40  
However, neither the affiant nor Ceballos’s supervisors agreed with 
 
27 Id. at 574. 
28 461 U.S. 138 (1983). 
29 547 U.S. 410 (2006). 
30 Connick, 461 U.S. at 148-49. 
31 Id. at 141. 
32 Father of the jazz musician, Harry Connick, Jr.  See Connick, Harry Jr., 
ENCYCLOPEDIA.COM, http://www.encyclopedia.com/topic/Harry_Jr._Connick.aspx (last visit-
ed Jan. 27, 2015). 
33 Connick, 431 U.S. at 141. 
34 Id. at 154. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. at 147. 
37 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 415. 
38 Id. at 413. 
39 Id. at 414. 
40 Id. 
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him, and they proceeded with the prosecution.41  Ceballos recounted 
his observations about the affidavit at a court hearing.42  He was then 
reassigned, transferred to another courthouse and denied a promotion, 
actions which he regarded as retaliatory.43 
Since Ceballos had written his memorandum questioning the 
affidavit in the course of his employment duties, the district court 
granted summary judgment in favor of his adversaries.44  The Ninth 
Circuit reversed on the ground that Ceballos’s memorandum, which 
recited what he regarded as government misconduct, was inherently a 
matter of public concern.45 
The Supreme Court reversed 5-4 in an opinion by Justice 
Kennedy.46  Since Ceballos had written his memorandum as part of 
his regular duties as a prosecutor, the Court held that he was not pro-
tected against discipline because “when public employees make 
statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not 
speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitu-
tion does not insulate their communications from employer disci-
pline.”47  To hold otherwise, as the Ninth Circuit had done, would 
mean the unwarranted displacement of the managerial discretion 
which supervisors need to do their job, and its replacement by intru-
sive judicial supervision, which would disrupt official business.48 
Acknowledging that cases in which government employees 
sued alleging retaliatory termination were not straightforward, the 
Court stated that courts must first determine whether the employee 
spoke on a subject of public concern.49  If yes, the courts must decide 
whether the government entity was justified in “treating the employee 
differently from any other member of the general public.”50  Whether 
the speech in question was on a matter of public concern depended on 
whether it occurred in the workplace and whether it was made pursu-
 
41 Id. 
42 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 414. 
43 Id. at 414-15. 
44 Id. at 414; see Ceballos v. Garcetti, No. CV0011106AHMAJWX, 2002 WL 34098285, 
at *7 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 2002). 
45 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 415-16; see Ceballos v. Garcetti, 361 F.3d 1168, 1173 (9th Cir. 
2004). 
46 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 426. 
47 Id. at 421. 
48 See id. at 411. 
49 Id. at 418 (citing Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568). 
50 Id. (citing Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568). 
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ant to the public employee’s job duties.51 
III. THE SUPREME COURT DECISION IN LANE V. FRANKS 
Applying the Garcetti test, the district court in Lane noted 
that while Lane’s testimony against Schmitz at the grand jury and at 
trial did not occur in the workplace, Lane had learned of its substance 
while serving in his official capacity as Director at CITY.52  Thus, the 
court concluded that Lane’s speech was made as part of his official 
job duties as Director of CITY and not made as a citizen on a matter 
of public concern.53  Accordingly, the court granted summary judg-
ment for the defendants.54  The Eleventh Circuit affirmed in a per cu-
riam opinion, while noting that courts in the Seventh and Third Cir-
cuits had reached the opposite conclusion and had conferred First 
Amendment protection on public employees’ deposition testimony.55 
The Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion by Justice So-
tomayor, reversed the lower courts, both of which had held that the 
mere fact that Lane had testified pursuant to subpoenas at the Grand 
Jury and at Schmitz’s trial did not necessarily make his speech a mat-
ter of public concern.56  The Court had granted certiorari to consider 
“whether the First Amendment protects a public employee who pro-
vided truthful sworn testimony, compelled by subpoena, outside the 
course of his ordinary job responsibilities.”57  The Court’s answer: 
“We hold that it does.”58 
Citing 18 U.S.C. § 1623, which criminalizes false statements 
under oath in judicial proceedings, the Court noted that the obligation 
to testify truthfully while under oath “is a quintessential example of 
speech as a citizen . . . .”59  The Court acknowledged that when testi-
fying under oath pursuant to a subpoena, “a public employee . . . may 
bear separate obligations to his employer . . . .  But any such obliga-
tions as an employee are distinct and independent from the obliga-
 
51 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418-19. 
52 Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2376; Lane, 2012 WL 5289412, at *10. 
53 See supra note 51. 
54 Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2376; Lane, 2012 WL 5289412, at *6. 
55 Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2383; see Lane, 523 F. App’x at 712 n.3. 
56 Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2383. 
57 Id. at 2378. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. at 2379. 
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tion, as a citizen, to speak the truth.”60  Thus, “[i]n holding that Lane 
did not speak as a citizen when he testified, the Eleventh Circuit read 
Garcetti far too broadly.”61 
The Court noted that government policies are of interest to the 
public at large, and public employees “are uniquely qualified to 
comment” on such matters because of what they learn on the job.62  
Moreover, employee speech is especially important in the context of 
a public corruption scandal;63 there are more than 1000 prosecutions 
for federal corruption offenses annually, and they often require testi-
mony by other government employees.64  Obviously, corruption on 
the part of public officials is a vital matter of public concern, and it 
would be perverse if public employees, speaking publicly to disclose 
wrongdoing and thereby serving the public interest, could be fired 
with impunity, and be without the remedy of a retaliation claim based 
on violation of their free speech rights.  The government defendants 
in Lane were unable to cite any governmental interest that would 
counter-balance Lane’s free speech rights on “the Pickering scale.”65 
IV. COMMENTARY 
The Eleventh Circuit in Lane had taken a literal, doctrinaire 
view of Garcetti, which led to an outrageous result.66  The public has 
 
60 Id. 
61 Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2379. 
62 Id. at 2379-80 (quoting Roe, 543 U.S. at 80). 
63 Id. at 2380.  Justice Souter, dissenting in Garcetti,  disagreed with the majority’s “cate-
gorical den[ial] of Pickering protection to any speech uttered ‘pursuant to . . . official duties.’ 
”  547 U.S. at 430 (quoting id. at 421).  He noted that Pickering recognized that “public em-
ployees are often the members of the community who are likely to have informed opinions 
as to the operations of their public employers, operations which are of substantial concern to 
the public. . . .”   Id. at 433.  Seemingly anticipating the very problem later posed by Lane v. 
Franks, he emphasized that “the public’s interest in receiving informed opinion” and “the 
employee’s own right to disseminate it . . . [are] . . . not a whit less true when an employee’s 
job duties require him to speak about such things: when for example, a public auditor speaks 
on his discovery of embezzlement of public funds . . . .”  Id. (quoting Roe, 543 U.S. at 82).  
And while an auditor may discover such embezzlement in the course of his official duties, 
the public interest in publicizing it is no less implicated when an official like Lane acci-
dentally stumbles on it while performing an administrative role.  If the majority in Garcetti 
had paid heed to this caution by Justice Souter rather than categorically denying Pickering 
protection to speech by public employees performing their official duties, the misapprehen-
sion by the Eleventh Circuit of the legal principle involved and the entire litigation of Lane 
v. Franks might have been avoided. 
64 Lane, 134 S. Ct at 2380. 
65 Id. at 2381. 
66 Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2376-78; Lane, 523 F. App’x at 710-12. 
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an interest in identifying, exposing, and prosecuting criminals; thus, it 
is not surprising that the Supreme Court unanimously reversed the 
Eleventh Circuit’s decision.67  The Supreme Court sent a clear mes-
sage that its jurisprudence limiting the free speech rights of public 
employees could no longer be used to shield vindictive scoundrels 
like Schmitz, or to leave those who expose them and are dismissed in 
reprisal without a legal remedy.68 
I believe that the unanimous decision in Lane is obviously 
correct.  However, the contrary argument is that the entire case was 
unnecessary, and the Supreme Court in Garcetti may have invited the 
extreme and unacceptable Eleventh Circuit approach, which it uncer-
emoniously uprooted in Lane.  It left itself open for such an approach 
when Justice Kennedy stated flatly in Garcetti: “We hold that when 
public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, 
the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment pur-
poses, and the Constitution does not insulate their communications 
from employer discipline.”69 
While the precise scope of public employees’ “official duties” 
may be debatable, this rather absolute statement is susceptible of the 
extreme interpretation placed on it by the Eleventh Circuit.70  After 
Lane, it is plain that this statement can no longer be taken literally.  
The Supreme Court apparently has qualified it by implication, but it 
would have been preferable and more candid if the Court had done so 
explicitly. 
In any event, the jurisprudence of Garcetti and Connick, both 
decided by bare majorities, has imposed on federal courts the chal-
lenging and unnecessarily complex task of determining whether a 
particular public employee’s utterances were made as part of her offi-
cial duties or otherwise.71  I agree with Justices Stevens and Souter 
who anticipated such difficulties in their dissents in Garcetti.  As Jus-
tice Stevens stated, “[t]he notion that there is a categorical difference 
between speaking as a citizen and speaking in the course of one’s 
employment is quite wrong.”72  He felt it was “senseless” to let con-
stitutional protection for the same words depend on whether they fell 
 
67 Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2380-81. 
68 Id. at 2380. 
69 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421. 
70 Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2376-77; Lane, 523 F. App’x at 711 n.2. 
71 See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 423-25; Connick, 461 U.S. at 150-51. 
72 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 427 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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within a job description, and that it was “perverse” to adopt a rule 
that gives employees an incentive to voice their concerns publicly be-
fore talking frankly with their superiors.73  Surely, the convoluted 
analyses made necessary by the Garcetti decision and the resultant 
legal confusion anticipated by Justices Stevens and Souter should 
have and would have been avoided if the result in Garcetti had been 
4-5 instead of 5-4. 
 
 
73 Id. 
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